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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 : 
Signing of pleadings, motions, affidavits, and other papers; representations to court; 
sanctions. 
(a) Signature. 
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least 
one attorney of record, or, if the party7 is not represented, by the party. 
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by law as 
binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied by affidavit 
or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule requires an 
affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the person may 
submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section 78B-5-705. If a statute 
requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature and the 
party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 46-1-16. 
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is 
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to 
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary7 support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made 
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in 
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may 
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or 
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court 
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses 
and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In 
appropriate circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for 
violations committed by its partners, members, and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an 
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) 
and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not 
violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule 
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or 
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a 
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion 
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant 
of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a 
violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless 
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement 
of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be 
sanctioned. 
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the 
sanction imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to 
the provisions of Rules 26 through 37, 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE 
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that GR 2 was 
responsible, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), for a representation to the 
court made by a non-attorney member of GR 2, when Rule 11(b) only applies to 
representations made by an attorney or unrepresented party, GR 2 was represented 
by an attorney at the time, and the filing was not made by GR 2's attorney? 
Standard of Review 
In evaluating the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, legal conclusions are 
reviewed under the legal correctness standard. Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, *! 12-
13, 973 P.2d 422, (Utah 1999). Under this standard, 'correctness' means that the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the 
trial judge's determination of law. Id. 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved in GR 2's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, filed on 
December 12, 2008, and during the hearing on GR 2's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, held December 23, 2008. (R. 225, 295:19). 
ISSUE TWO 
Whether the District Court violated GR 2's due process rights under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11(c) when it failed to enter an order to show cause prior to sua 
sponte scheduling a Rule 11 hearing, provided GR 2 with only a day's notice of 
9 
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the Rule 11 hearing, and did not provide GR2 with any reasonable opportunity to 
respond prior to making a determination at the hearing? 
Standard of Review 
Legal conclusions, including whether procedural and due process 
requirements have been met, are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness. In re: K.ML 965 P,2d 576, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved in GR 2's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, filed on 
December 12, 2008, and during the hearing on GR 2's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, held December 23, 2008. (R. 225, 295:18). 
ISSUE THREE 
Wliether the District Court violated the procedural requirements of Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11 when it failed to enter an order describing the violating 
conduct and explaining the basis for the sanction imposed? 
Standard of Review 
Legal conclusions, including whether a Trial Court's Order complied with 
the requirements of Rule 11, are reviewed under the legal correctness standard. 
Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, % 12-13, 973 P.2d 422, (Utah 1999). Under this 
standard, 'correctness' means that the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. Id 
10 
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Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved in GR 2's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, filed on 
December 12, 2008, and during the hearing on GR 2's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment held December 23, 2008. (R. 225, 295:26-27). 
ISSUE FOUR 
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the filings by 
Mr. Granados violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 when (1) there is no Utah 
precedent dealing with pleadings issued by the tribal courts of unrecognized native 
american tribes and (2) it is not well settled in other jurisdictions that the filing of 
such pleadings is a Rule 11 violation. 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's ultimate conclusion that rule 11 was violated and any 
subsidiary legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard. 
Barnard v.SutlifK 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992). 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved in GR 2's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, filed on 
December 12, 2008, and during the hearing on GR 2's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, held December 23, 2008. (R. 225, 295:21-25). 
ISSUE FIVE 
Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law because entry of a default 
11 
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judgment is not authorized as a sanction for a violation of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 or, alternatively, whether the District Court abused its discretion, 
under the circumstances of this case, when it imposed the sanction of a default 
judgment. 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's ultimate conclusion that rule 11 was violated and any 
subsidiary legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard. 
Barnard v. SutlifC 846 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1992), A trial court's determination 
as to the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. 
Preservation for Appeal 
This issue was preserved in GR 2's Motion to Set Aside Judgment filed on 
December 12, 2008, and during the hearing on GR 25s Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment held December 23,2008. (R. 225, 295:19-20,26). 
12 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeal has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78A-4-!03(2)(j) (2009) whereby the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over cases transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. In 
this case, the Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009), whereby the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on January 5,2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an appeal from a December 9, 2009, order of the district court finding 
Defendant/Appellant GR 2 Enterprises LLC ("GR T) to be in violation of Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11 and, as a sanction, entering a default judgment against GR 2. (R: 204, 
223, 294). 
On October 16, 2008, a Complaint for Eviction was filed against GR2 by appellee 
DFI Properties LLC ("DFI"). (R. 7). GR2 answered and counter-claimed against DFI on 
October 21, 2008. (R. 29). On November 12,2008, the district court scheduled the 
matter for a jury trial to begin on December 17, 2008. (R, 166), On November 26, 2008, 
GR2's attorney, Mr. Randall Jeffs, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel. (R. 183). On 
December 4,2008, in a telephonic conference that was held off the record, the district 
13 
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court apparently denied or deferred ruling on Mr. Jeffs Motion to Withdraw because it 
would have required a continuance of the trial. (R. 193). On December 8,2008, Mr. 
Juan Antonio Granados, a member of GR 2, filed a Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, 
Stay of Proceedings and For Declaratory Relief, an Order for Hearing to Show Cause, 
and an Order to Stay Proceedings. (R. 194-202). On the same day, the district court held 
a telephonic conference with Mr. Jeffs and Counsel for DFL (R.293). At the telephonic 
conference, the district court informed the parties that it was, sua sponte, scheduling a 
Rule 11 hearing for the next day, December 9, 2008. (R. 293:6-7). At the Rule 11 
hearing, the district court held GR 2 to be in violation of Rule 11 and, as a sanction, 
struck GR 2's answer and counterclaim and entered a default judgment against it. (R: 
204, 223, 294). 
GR 2 subsequently retained new counsel and filed Motions to Set Aside Judgment 
and Stay Execution of Judgment on December 12, 2008. (R. 225-240). GR 2 also filed a 
Notice of Appeal on December 19, 2009. On December 23, 2008, the district court held 
a hearing in which it denied GR 2?s motions. (R. 277). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On November 26, 2008, GR2*s former attorney, Mr. Randall Jeffs, filed a Motion 
to Withdraw as counsel. (R. 183). In the motion, Mr. Jeffs explained that he was seeking 
to withdraw because he could not reach an agreement with GR 2 "on the proper process 
for preparing the case for trial and the appropriate way to present evidence and testimony 
at trial" and GR 2 had failed to return his communications. (R. 182-83). Because the 
underlying case was for unlawful detainer and GR 2 was still occupying the property in 
question, the district court had previously ruled that a trial of the unlawful detainer issue 
had to be conducted within 60 days pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 70B-6-810. (R. 291-
14 
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92). Accordingly, on December 4, in a pretrial conference that was held off the record, 
the district court apparently ruled that, unless GR 2 vacated the property, Mr. Jeffs 
would not be permitted to withdraw because the trial date could not be continued while 
GR 2 still occupied the property. (R. 193). 
The nature of the communications between Mr. Jeffs and GR 2 regarding Mr. 
Jeffs Motion to Withdraw are not contained in the record. Apparently, Mr. Juan Antonio 
Granados, one of the members of GR 2, believed that Mr. Jeff no longer represented GR 
2 and that the trial would proceed as scheduled on December 17, 2009. As a result GR2 
consulted with Mr. Henry Clayton, the Chief Justice of the Nato Nation Indian Tribe (the 
"Nato Nation"). Mr. Clayton informed Mr. Granados that GR 2 could remove the case to 
the Nato Nation's Tribal Court and that GR 2 did not need to be represented by an 
attorney in tribal court. Accordingly, on December 8,2008, Mr. Granados filed three 
documents with the district court: a Petition for Hearing to Show Cause, Stay of 
Proceedings and For Declaratory Relief, an Order for Hearing to Show Cause, and an 
Order to Stay Proceedings (the "Nato Nation documents"). (R. 194-202). All three 
documents were titled as having been prepared for and filed in the First Federal District 
Court Western Region. (R. 195, 197,202). 
On the very same day that Mr. Granados filed the Nato Nation documents, the 
district court initiated a review hearing with Mr. Jeffs and DFFs counsel. (R. 293). At 
the hearing, the district court stated that it had received the documents filed by Mr. 
Granados and that "the first thing I need to do is to have a Rule 11 contempt hearing in 
the next a, little while to decide whether to strike all of defendant's pleadings and enter a 
default based on a Rule 11 violation." (R 293:4). The district court further stated that 
"given these intervening pleadings a, I'm not willing to interfere with the lives of a, 30 to 
40 members of our public when bad faith action such as this have taken place." (R: 
15 
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293:4-5). The district court then scheduled a Rule 11 hearing for 2:30pm the next day, 
December 9, 2008. (R. 203, 293:5). 
During the December 8 hearing the district court also told Mr. Jeffs that it "totally 
[understood] the perplexing and uncomfortable situation that this puts you in ... And if 
you can just abide a little further a, we will release you from this case because it's not 
tenable for you to continue under the circumstances/5 (R. 293:5). Mr. Jeffs was asked to 
inform GR 2 of the hearing by letter and "if you fear for your safety I would suggest you 
employ a constable to serve your letter." (R.293:6), After the district court noted that 
"Mr. Granados is attempting to move forward pro se representing a corporate entity, 
which as we all know is not going to happen ... [sjo. in your letter inform him that if he 
wants to be heard he'll need to bring a lawyer/' it told Mr. Jeffs that "at the end of the 
hearing tomorrow I'll make a final ruling on your motion to withdraw." (R 293:6-7). 
At the Rule 11 hearing, Mr. Jeffs initially appeared for GR 2. (R. 294:1). 
However, before proceeding with the argument, the district court asked Mr. Granados to 
confirm that GR 2 no longer desired Mr. Jeffs as its attorney, (R. 294:2). Mr. Granados 
responded as follows: "According to the letter he sent me two days ago that he requires 
more money [with the remaining response being inaudible]/' IdL The district court then 
told Mr. Jeffs that i ' m going to ask you to stay here because I haven't released you yet 
but you may take a seat... [a]nd I'll allow Mr. Granados to come up here to counsel 
table." Id 
After Mr. Granados verified that he had caused the Natio Nation documents to be 
filed, the district court did not allow either Mr. Jeffs or Mr. Granados to present any 
arguments. (R: 294:3). Instead, the district court summarily stated that it had reviewed 
the Nato Nation documents "and found that their legal contentions are not warranted by 
existing law and are in fact frivolous, and that the allegations in them a, don't have 
16 
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evidentiary support." (R 294:3-4). The district court then told Mr, Granados that he 
could ''address the court on what you think should happen at this point." (R.294:4). 
Mr. Granados stated that he had been sick and unable to pay Mr. Jeffs but thought 
that his case was meritorious. (R. 294:4). Mr. Granados also told the district court that 
he had only received notice of the hearing late in the evening of December 8 and had 
been impossible for him to retain another attorney in the short time that he had been 
given. (R 294:5). 
After allowing Mr. Granados to speak his few sentences, the district court held 
that "there's no reasonable basis to believe that these documents are anything other than 
frivolous, that they have been submitted to the court for, the only reason was to delay 
these proceedings ... Based upon that finding under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure I'm going to strike your answer and counterclaim and enter a default against 
you." (R 294:8). The district court then granted Mr. Jeffs' motion to withdraw. (R 
294:10), The district court did not file any written order regarding it Rule 11 hearing. 
Instead, it entered minutes stating that "[t]he Court strikes the Defendant's answer and 
counterclaim and enters a default against the defendant," as well as a final Judgment. (R. 
204, 223). 
According to the transcript, the basis for the district court's finding were a Federal 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit case titled Nato Nation v. State of Utah, which 
held that the Nato Nation was not recognized as having any standing by the United States 
Department of the Interior, and its review of the Bureau of Indian Affairs listing of 
federally recognized Indian entities. (R: 294:6). At the hearing on GR 2's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment on December 23, 2008, the district court provided little further 
explanation for its December 9 ruling. Instead, it said that "[i]f you take the Nato Nation 
and stick it into Google, one of the first things that comes up is the 10th Circuit decision 
17 
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... So I really believe that Mr. Granados could have, a found that with fairly easy access/' 
(R. 295:28). 
At the December 23 hearing, the district court also referred to prior hearings in 
which DFI had claimed that Mr. Granados conveyed fractional interests in a California 
property to different entities which were later found to be fictitious, that each of those 
fictitious entities then filed their own bankruptcies and invoked the automatic stay, and 
that the bankruptcy court finally ruled that this was a scheme and an artifice to defraud 
DFL (R, 292:7-8). The district court noted that it had previously not had any evidence 
that Mr, Granados had in fact deeded fractional interests but Mr. Granados had 
substantiated this in the Nato Nation documents. (R. 295:29). The district court stated 
that it had decided on the ultimate sanction of dismissal because GR 2 had already been 
"devious" prior to filing the Nato Nation documents and "the specific purpose of filing 
the order attempting to stay this case was to derail a trial which had been set/' (R. 
295:31). 
However, the Nato Nation documents do not contain any reference to Mr. 
Granados deeding fractional interests in order to defraud creditors. Instead, the only 
relevant document within the record is an affidavit by Mr. Granados, attached as Exhibit 
B of GR 2's answer and counterclaim, stating that Mr. Granados had deeded fractional 
interests in his property in exchange for three installments of $45,000. (R. 11). The 
ruling of the bankruptcy court proffered by DFI was not entered in GR 2's bankruptcy 
case and did not find that GR 2 or Mr. Granados were involved in the attempt to defraud 
creditors. (R. 65-85). 
18 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
First the district court erred in applying Rule 11 to the filings made by Mr. 
Granados because Rule 11 only applies to representations made by an attorney or an 
unrepresented party. In this case, Rule 11 was never invoked because GR 2 was 
represented by an attorney at the time of the filings and GR 2's attorney did not file the 
offending documents. Furthermore, because GR 2 is a corporate entity and Mr. Granados 
is not an attorney. Mr. Granados' actions cannot be imputed to GR 2. 
Second, the district court violated the due process notice requirements Rule 11 by 
foiling to enter an order to show cause and providing GR 2 with only a day's notice of the 
Rule 11 hearing. In addition, the district court deprived GR 2 of its due process right to a 
reasonably respond under Rule 11 when it asked GR 2's attorney to take a seat without 
responding to the Rule 11 violations, summarily held that GR 2 had violated Rule 11, and 
allowed a non-attorney to speak on behalf of GR 2 after already determining that a 
violation of Rule 11 had occurred. 
Third, the district court failed to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 11 
when it failed to enter an order describing GR 2's violative conduct and explaining the 
basis for its sanctions. The district court did not enter a written order and the written 
record and the transcripts of the hearing are unclear as to whether the statements by the 
district court constituted formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Fourth, the district court erred as a matter of law in holding that the filing of the 
Nato Nation documents violated Rule 11 because its determination was based solely on 
the Nato Nation's status as an unrecognized tribe. Filing the Nato Nation pleadings was 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances because there is no Utah law prohibiting 
the filing of pleadings from the tribal courts of native American tribes that have not been 
recognized by the United States Department of the Interior (USDOI) or finding the filing 
of such pleadings to be frivolous or another violation of Rule 11. Similarly, there is no 
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clear law from other jurisdictions making such a finding. 
Fifth, the District Court erred as a matter of law because Rule 1 Idoes not 
authorize or contemplate entry of a default judgment as a sanction. Alternatively, even if 
the Court was authorized to impose the sanction of default judgment under Rule 11, such 
a sanction was not warranted under the circumstances of this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that GR 2 was 
responsible, under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), for a filing made by a 
non-attorney member of GR 2 because Rule 11(b) only applies to filings made 
by an attorney or unrepresented party, GR 2 was represented by an attorney 
at the time, and the filing was not made by GR 2's attorney. 
The district court erred in holding GR 2 responsible under Rule 11(b) for the 
filings made by Mr. Granados because GR 2 was represented by an attorney at the time 
of the filings and GR 2's attorney did not file the offending documents, Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11(b) states that "[b]y presenting a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances/" that the 
representations within the document meets the criteria specified in subsections (b)(1) 
through (b)(4). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) (2009) (emphasis added). As a 
result. Rule 11(b) only applies to representations made by an attorney or an unrepresented 
party. It cannot apply to a filing made by someone other than the attorney of a 
represented party. 
While the scope of Rule 11 (b) is a question of first impression in Utah, some 
guidance is provided by Agency of Natural Resources v. Lyndonville Savings Bank & 
Trust Co.. 811 A.2d 1232 (Vt. 2001), in which the Vermont Supreme Court was 
confronted with similar circumstances. In Lydonville, the Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources had issued an administrative order claiming that the Bank had violated 
Vermont's "heavy cutting" logging law and imposing a civil penalty of $22,000. Id. The 
Bank subsequently challenged the administrative order in the district court. ML During 
the pendency of the action, the Bank served the Agency with a motion for sanctions 
under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which is substantially similar to Utah Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 11. Id. The Rule 11 motion asserted that the Agency's decision to 
proceed with an enforcement action against the Bank was frivolous because the Agency 
should have known that it would be unable to prove that the Bank had violated the 
logging law at the time it entered the administrative order. Id. The Rule 11 motion was 
directed at actions of the Agency itself rather than the actions of the Agency's attorney. 
Id. While the district court subsequently ordered that the Agency's administrative order 
be dismissed with prejudice, it denied the Bank's Rule 11 motion for sanctions. Id. 
When the Bank appealed the district court's denial of sanctions, the Vermont 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court and held that Rule 11 was inapplicable to the 
situation. Id. at 233. Specifically, the Vermont Supreme Court held that ^[sjanctions 
against a represented party are not covered by Rule 11; nor are sanctions based upon out-
of-court activity... Rule 11 is the appropriate vehicle only if one seeks sanctions against 
an unrepresented party or a lawyer for a party. Neither Rule 11 nor its safe harbor 
provision applies if the moving party is seeking sanctions against a represented litigant.*' 
Id. Accordingly, while "Rule 11 prohibits certain misconduct by san attorney or 
unrepresented party,' •- and allows sanctions against those persons[,]" the court found it 
was not applicable where the Bank sought to apply Rule 11 to an out-of-court document 
that had not been filed by the Agency's attorney. IdL 
Similarly, in this case, GR 2 was not an unrepresented party at the time the Nato 
Nation documents were filed and it is undisputed that Mr. Jeffs, GR 2*s attorney at the 
time, did not file the Nato Nation documents. Furthermore, even if Mr. Granados 
believed that GR 2 was no longer represented by Mr. Jeffs at the time of the Nato Nation 
documents were filed, his actions cannot be imputed to GR 2. "It has long been the law 
of this jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed 
attorney.'' Tracy-Burke Associates v. Dept. of Employment Security, 699 P.2d 687, 688 
(Utah 1985) (dismissing appellant's petition for writ of review because the appellant was 
not represented by an attorney). Mr. Granados is not an attorney and, as a result, he 
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cannot represent GR 2 in court. Indeed, the district court recognized as much when it 
told Mr. Jeffs that "Mr. Granados is attempting to move forward pro se representing a 
corporate entity, which as we all know is not going to happen ... [s]o in your letter 
inform him that if he wants to be heard he'll need to bring a lawyer," (R 293:6-7). 
Accordingly, Rule 11 simply does not apply to the circumstances of this case and 
the district court erred as a matter of law in sanctioning GR 2 under Rule 11. Specifically, 
Rule 11 was never invoked because the requirements of Rule 11(b) were not met - the 
Nato Nation documents were not filed by GR 2's attorney nor was GR 2 an 
unrepresented party at the time of the filing. Furthermore, because GR 2 is a corporate 
entity and Mr. Granados is not an attorney, Mr. Granados' actions cannot even be 
imputed to GR 2. 
II. District Court violated GR 2's due process rights under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11(c) when it failed to enter an order to show cause prior to sua 
sponte scheduling a Rule 11 hearing, provided GR 2 with only a day's notice 
of the Rule 11 hearing, and did not provide GR2 with any reasonable 
opportunity to respond prior to making a determination at the hearing. 
The due process requirements of Rule 11 require that a party receive sufficient 
notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond prior to the imposition of sanctions. 
However, these due process requirements were not met in this case because the district 
court failed to enter an order to show cause prior to scheduling the Rule 11 hearing, only 
provided GR 2 with a day's notice prior to the hearing, did not provide GR 2 with an 
opportunity to submit a written brief prior to the hearing, and did not provide GR 2 with 
an opportunity to respond at the hearing itself. In order to initiate Rule 11 sanction sua 
sponte, "the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to 
violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it 
has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
11(c)(1)(B) (2009). Furthermore, under Rule 11, a court may only impose sanctions 
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"[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that 
subdivision (b) has been violated." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) (2009) (emphasis 
added). In this case, the district court failed to comply with either of these due process 
requirements of Rule 11. 
First, the district court failed to enter an order describing the offending conduct 
and directing GR 2 to show cause why it has not violated Rule 11. Utah's Rule 11 is 
based upon the substantially similar federal rule. The federal rule's requirement that the 
court enter an order to show cause was added because a party is not shielded by the 21-
day "safe harbor" period when a court initiates Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte. The Notes 
of the Advisory Committee on the 1993 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
1L specifically note that "[tjhe power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, 
but with the condition that this be done through a show cause order ... [t]his procedure 
provides the person with notice and an opportunity to respond." Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 Advisory Committee Notes to 1993 Amendments. As a result, federal 
appellate courts have held that "when the district court itself initiates sanctions 
proceedings, it shall enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate 
Rule 11(b) and directing the attorney to show cause why he has not committed a violation 
with respect to that specific conduct." Thornton v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 
451 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing and vacating district court's Rule 11 sanctions because the 
court's show cause order did not describe the specific conduct for which it subsequently 
sanctioned the attorney deprived attorney of adequate notice to afford him an opportunity 
to respond). See also L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138F.3d81, 89(2ndCir. 
1998) C[i]f the sanctions are to be imposed sua sponte [under Rule 11], the court must 
proceed by order to show cause"). Similarly, in Poulsen v. Freer, 946 P.2d 738, 743 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Utah Court of Appeals noted that "[w]hen a court imposes 
sanctions sua sponte, due process requirements are met if the court issues an order to 
show cause ... and allows the party a reasonable time in which to file a response." 
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Accordingly, in this case, the district court did not comply with the requirements of Rule 
11 when it failed to enter an order to show cause. 
Second, GR 2 did not receive sufficient notice of the Rule 11 hearing and was 
denied a reasonable opportunity to respond at the hearing itself. "Timely and adequate 
notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of 
procedural fairness." State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
"Sufficient notice is informing a party of the specific issues which they must prepare to 
meet and giving the party a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing 
party and to meet them." Id. (quotations omitted). See also Ex Rel. B.R., 2006 UT App 
354, f77 ("Parties are deprived of due process when they are not properly informed of the 
nature of a proceeding, or notice is not given sufficiently in advance to allow 
preparation"). The only notice GR 2 received regarding the Rule 11 sanctions was during 
a review hearing the district court held with counsel on December 8, 2008, in which the 
court stated that it would hold a Rule 11 sanction hearing the very next day. 
Furthermore, the district court did not inform GR 2's counsel that he should be prepared 
to respond on GR 2's behalf at the Rule 11 hearing. Instead, the district court told Mr. 
Jeffs that he would be allowed to withdraw as counsel at the end of the hearing, 
instructed Mr. Jeffs to inform GR 2 of the hearing through an off-record letter, and stated 
"that if [GR 2] wants to be heard [it will] need to bring a lawyer." (R 293:5-7). GR 2 
only received the letter informing it of the Rule 11 hearing in the late evening and, as a 
result was unable to retain new counsel on the morning before the hearing. Given the 
timing and nature of the notice GR 2 received, it was clearly not afforded sufficient 
notice to adequately respond at the Rule 11 hearing. 
Furthermore, GR 2 was deprived of any meaningful opportunity to respond at the 
Rule 11 hearing itself. Although Mr. Jeffs initially appeared for GR 2, the district court 
did not ask him to respond to the Rule 11 allegations on behalf of GR 2. Instead, it 
instructed Mr. Jeffs to take a seat and instructed Mr. Granados to come up to the counsel 
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table. (R. 294:1-2). Then, after verifying that Mr. Granados had filed the Nato Nation 
documents, the district court summarily concluded that it had reviewed the Nato Nation 
documents "and found that their legal contentions are not warranted by existing law and 
are in fact frivolous, and that the allegations in them a, don't have evidentiary support." 
(R 294:3-4). Although the district court later told Mr. Granados that he could "address 
the court on what you think should happen at this point[,]"Mr, Granados is not an 
attorney and his subsequent statements did not represent the response of GR 2. 
(R.294:4). In effect, the district court made its Rule 11 determination without affording 
GR 2 with any opportunity to respond. 
As a result, the district court violated the due process notice requirements Rule 11 
by failing to enter an order to show cause and providing GR 2 with only a day's notice of 
the Rule 11 hearing. Furthermore, the district court deprived GR 2 of its due process 
right to a reasonable response under Rule 11 when it asked GR 2's attorney to take a seat 
without responding to the Rule 11 violations, summarily held that GR 2 had violated 
Rule 11. and allowed a non-attorney to speak on behalf of GR 2 after it had already 
determined that a violation of Rule 11 had occurred. 
III. The District Court violated the procedural requirements of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 when it failed to enter an order describing the violating conduct 
and explaining the basis for the sanction imposed. 
The district court foiled to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 11 when it 
failed to enter an order describing GR 2's violative conduct and explaining the basis for 
its sanctions. "When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined 
to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3) (2008). As a result, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an order 
entered under Rule 11 must explain why the conduct was found to be in violation and 
why the court imposed the particular sanction. See Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, % 13-14, 
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973 P.2d 422, (Utah 1999) ("there should be findings on the record, or other appropriate 
explanation of the trial court's rationale, that will enable the appellate courts to apply the 
Sutliff standard"). Thus, in Crockett v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 
232 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court reversed an award of sanctions and remanded 
the matter to the district court for the entry of more detailed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law because it could not "determine whether the imposition of sanctions 
[was] proper as a matter of law and, if the sanctions were imposed for a violation of rule 
11, whether the district court abused its discretion in formulating the type and amount of 
the sanction." 
In this case, the district court failed to enter any written order detailing GR 2's 
offensive conduct and the basis for its sanction of default judgment. Instead, during the 
December 9, 2008, hearing, the Court stated that filing of the Nato Nation documents 
were violated Rule 11 because a Federal Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit case 
titled Nato Nation v. State of Utah and the Bureau of Indian Affairs' listing of federally 
recognized Indian entities did not recognize the Nato Nation as having any standing with 
the United States Department of the Interior. (R: 294:6). However, the court did not 
enter into any examination of whether Mr. Granados* research into the law and facts 
surrounding the filing were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Taylor 
v. Hansen. 958 P.2d 923, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[i]n determining whether conduct 
violates Rule 11, the court must focus on whether the alleged violator's research into the 
law and facts surrounding a filing is 'objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances/"). Nor did the court explain why the filing of the Nato Nation documents 
was, in itself, a violation of Rule 1L Furthermore, the district court failed to provide any 
explanation on the record for why it imposed the sanction of a default judgment against 
GR2. 
At the hearing on GR 2's Motion to Set Aside Judgment on December 23, 2008, 
the district court provided little further explanation for its Rule 11 determination. 
27 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Instead, it said that "[ijf you take the Nato Nation and stick it into Google, one of the first 
things that comes up is the 10th Circuit decision ... So I really believe that Mr, Granados 
could have, a found that with fairly easy access." (R. 295:28). At the December 23, 
2008, hearing, district court did stated that it had chosen sanction of dismissal because 
GR 2 had already been "devious" prior to filing the Nato Nation documents and "the 
specific purpose of filing the order attempting to stay this case was to derail a trial which 
had been set." (R. 295:31). However, the written record and the transcripts of the 
hearing are unclear as to whether these statements by the district court constituted formal 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
IV. The District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the filings by Mr. 
Granados violated Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 when (1) there is no Utah 
precedent dealing with pleadings issued by the tribal courts of unrecognized 
native american tribes and (2) it is not well settled in other jurisdictions that 
the filing of such pleadings is a Rule 11 violation. 
The district court erred as a matter of law in holding that the filing of the Nato 
Nation documents violated Rule 11 because its determination was based solely on the 
Nato Nation's status as an unrecognized tribe. A violation of Rule 11 occurs if a court 
determines that a pleading presented by a person contains legal contentions unwarranted 
by existing law or a frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. Utah R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2) (2008). However, "[i]n determining whether 
conduct violates Rule 11, the court must focus on whether the alleged violator's research 
into the law and facts surrounding a filing is 'objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances.'" Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 930 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Barnard v. 
Sutliff, 846 P,2d 1229; 1236 (Utah 1992). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Barnard 
v. SutlifK 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1992): 
"Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive 
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research. The appropriate standard is whether the research was 
objectively reasonable under all the circumstances. Nor does rule 11 
require the attorney to reach the correct legal position from the 
research. It is enough that the attorney's reading of the law is a 
reasonable one. Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion 
after conducting appropriate research, the mere fact that the 
attorney's view of the law was wrong cannot support a finding of a 
rule 11 violation ... In short, the attorney's view must be objectively 
reasonable when it is compared to existing law." 
In this case, GR 2 does not dispute that the Nato Nation is unrecognized by the USDOI. 
Instead, GR 2 asserts that filing the Nato Nation pleadings was objectively reasonable 
under the circumstances because there is no Utah law prohibiting the filing of pleadings 
from the tribal courts of native American tribes that have not been recognized by the 
United States Department of the Interior (USDOI) or finding the filing of such pleadings 
to be frivolous or another violation of Rule 11. Similarly, there is no clear law from other 
jurisdictions making such a finding. 
First, there are no reported Utah cases regarding the filing of pleadings from an 
unrecognized tribal court in a Utah district court. There are only cases addressing the 
jurisdiction of the tribal courts of recognized native American tribes. See e.g. State v. 
Reber, 2005 UT App 485, % 1 (stating that jurisdiction lies in federal or tribal court for 
crimes committed in Indian Country if either the defendatnt or the victim is an Indian); In 
the interest of D.A.C. v. P.D.C., 933 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Utah Ct App. 1997) (stating that 
tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Indian 
children domiciled on a reservation and concurrent, but presumptively tribal, jurisdiction 
in proceedings involving Indian children not domiciled on a reservation); Searle v. Searle 
2001 UT App 367 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (detailing interaction between tribal court and 
juvenile court in child custody proceedings). As a result, Utah law regarding the status of 
pleadings from the tribal courts of unrecognized tribes is not settled. 
Second, cases from other jurisdictions do not appear to hold that the filing of 
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pleadings from unrecognized tribal courts is a violation of Rule 11. At both the 
December 9 and December 23 hearings, the district court referred to a Tenth Circuit court 
of appeals case titled Nato Nation v. Utah. Presumably the district court w^ as referring to 
an unpublished decision, Nato Indian Nation v. State of Utah, No. 02-4062 (10lh Cir. 
Aug. 8, 2003) (a copy of this unpublished opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A). 
However, in Nato Nation, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination 
that the Nato Nation is not an "Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly 
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior." It did not address whether the filing of 
pleadings from the Nato Nation tribal court in federal district court violated Rule 11. 
However, in Richmond v. Wampanoag Tribal Court Cases, 431 F.Supp.2d 1159, 11.60-61 
(D. Utah 2006), the federal district court for the state of Utah was confronted with a writ 
of mandamus captioned in the *Tembina Nation Little Shell California Federal Tribal 
Circuit Court." As in this case, the "Pembina Nation Little Shell Band" was found to be 
an unrecognized tribe. IdL at 1167-69. However, the Utah federal district court did not 
sua sponte raise the issue of a Rule 11 violation in response to the filing. Instead, the 
district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. IdL at 1160. 
When the petitioner sought to amend his petition. Judge Jenkins conducted a careful 
examination of the law in a 24 page decision before denying the motion to amend. As a 
result it does not appear that other jurisdictions find that the filing of pleadings from the 
tribal courts of unrecognized tribes are, per se, a violation of Rule 11. 
V. The District Court erred as a matter of law because entry of a default 
judgment is not authorized as a sanction for a violation of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 or, alternatively, the District Court abused its discretion, under 
the circumstances of this case, when it imposed the sanction of a default 
judgment. 
Rule 11 does not appear to contemplate the sanction of a default judgment and. 
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alternatively, if such a sanction is appropriate under Rule 11, the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing such a sanction in this case. "A sanction imposed for violation of 
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or 
comparable conduct by others similarly situated ... the sanction may consist of, or 
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if 
imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to 
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a 
direct result of the violation." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(2) (2009). 
Accordingly, under the plain language of the rule, the court is only authorized to enter an 
order to pay a penalty to the court or attorney fees. While the Rule authorizes the court to 
enter a directive of a nonmonetary nature as a sanction, Rule 11 does not appear 
contemplate the entry of an order of default judgment. Indeed, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has previously held that the normal sanction for a Rule 11 violation is recovery of 
attorneys' fees. Baillev-Allen Co. Jnc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 194 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). Accordingly, the district court's entry of a default judgment against GR 2 was not 
authorized as a sanction under Rule 11. 
Alternatively, even if the Court had the authority to impose the sanction of default 
judgment under the rule, such a sanction is not warranted under the circumstances of this 
case. Rule 11 states that the "sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited 
to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
11(c)(2) (2009). However, the entry of a default judgment is a severe sanction. See 
UDOT v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah 1995) ("The striking of pleadings, entering of 
default and rendering of judgment against a disobedient party are the most severe of the 
potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a nonresponding party ... [t]he courts, in the 
interest of justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for 
a hearing on the merits of every case." Thus, within the context of Rule 37 diseovery 
violations where the sanction of a default judgment is explicitly authorized, the 
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sanctioned party must usually act in an egregious or willful manner before a court 
imposes the sanction of a default judgment. See Hales v. Qldrovd, 2000 UT 75. 999 P.2d 
588.595 (Utah Ct App. 2000) (affirming dismissal based on ample evidence of multiple 
delays and failures to respond to discovery requests and court orders); Qsguthorpe, 892 
P.2d at 8 (finding more than adequate evidence that Osguthorpe willfully failed to 
respond to the court order compelling discovery). In this case, the filing of the Nato 
Nation documents alone does not provide sufficient grounds for entry7 of a default 
judgment. The Petition was not filed in violation of a Court order, nor was it based upon 
egregious conduct or a willful defiance of the Court's authority or jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, while the district court asserted that GR 2 had previously acted in a 
"devious manner/' it was referring to a proffer by DFI that Mr. Granados conveyed 
fractional Interests in a California property to different entities which were later found to 
be fictitious, that each of those fictitious entities then filed their own bankruptcies and 
invoked the automatic stay, and that a bankruptcy court finally ruled that this was a 
scheme and an artifice to defraud DFI. (EL 292:7-8). However, while Mr. Granados had 
admitted that he had deeded fractional interests in his property in exchange for three 
installments of $45,000, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Granados deeded the 
fractional interests in an effort to defraud DFI or had been involved in a scheme or 
artifice to defraud DFI or deceive the bankruptcy court. (R. 11). Indeed, the finding of a 
scheme to defraud DFI was not entered in a bankruptcy case not involving GR 2, and the 
order of the bankruptcy court did not find that GR 2 or Mr. Granados were involved in 
the attempt to defraud creditors. (R, 65-85). Accordingly, the district court abused its 
discretion when it imposed the harsh sanction of a default judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons. Appellant respectfully requests that the District Court's 
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December 9, 2008, Order and Judgment be reversed and the case be remanded to the 
District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2009. 
NadesanBeck P.C. 
\(Y^^> 
Karthik Nadesan 
Attorney for GR 2 Enterprises LLC 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
NATO INDIAN NATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
F I L E D 
United States Court of Appeals 
Tenth Circuit 
AUG 8 2003 
• P A T R I C K F I S H E R 
No. 02-4062Cierk 
(D. Utah) 
(D.Ct. No. 2:01-CV-802-J) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT1^ 
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O'BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument 
would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
Nato Indian Nation (Nato) appeals the dismissal of its complaint against the State of Utah by the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. Nato presents itself as "a sovereign indigenous government, 
whose citizenship is comprised of federally supervised and non-federally supervised indigenous citizens 
from various (Native American! tribal affiliations . . . ,n Apparently, Nato entered into an "intent to Joint 
Venture" with a private party regarding a mineral interest on state land administered by the State of Utah 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration.—When Nato was informed by an officer from the 
Trust Lands Administration that another private party claimed ownership to the mineral interest, it filed this 
complaint, signed by Henry Clayton, who listed his capacity as Chief Justice, Ministry of Justice, Western 
Regional Office, First Federal District Court, Nato Indian Nation. The complaint alleges the State of Utah 
mismanaged school trust lands relating to Nato's mineral interest.— 
The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. The court held: 1) it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over Nato's claims under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1362; 2) the White Mesa 
Utes and/or the Skull Valley Band of Goshutes could seek relief on their own initiative; 3) absent formal 
recognition by the Department of the Interior, Nato lacked standing to assert rights before the court as a 
recognized Native American Indian tribe; and 4) the two individuals, Ron Allen and Chief Henry Clayton, 
who represented Nato at the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss were not licensed attorneys and were 
not entitled to appear before the court in a representative capacity. The court later denied Nato's motion to 
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liter or amend judgment. 
)n appeal, Nato filed two separate docketing statements and one brief containing two parts. One docketing 
tatement and the second part of the brief were authored by Chief Henry Clayton; they address his ability to 
epresent Nato in court proceedings. The other docketing statement and first part of the brief were filed and 
igned by a licensed attorney; they deal with the other issues Nato raises in this appealM1 
n response to the docketing statement filed by Chief Henry Clayton, the State filed a motion to disqualify 
urn from filing pleadings or appearing in connection with this appeal. We agree with the State; a non-
awyer may not represent Nato in federal court.1^1 
ndividuals may appear in court pro se, but a corporation, other business entity, or non-profit organization 
nay only appear through a licensed attorney. Harrison v. Wahatoyas, L.L.C., 253 F.3d 552,556-57 (10th 
:ii\ 2001); Flora Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 413,414 (10th Cir. 1962), cert, denied, 
71 U.S. 950 (1963); Strong Delivery Ministry Ass'n v. Bd. of Appeals of Cook County, 543 F.2d 32, 33 (7th 
3r. 1976). See generally Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F.Supp. 451,476 (D. Ala. 1975) (consolidation 
»f cases from across the nation at the order of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to address the issues of pro se 
epresentation and the right of unlicensed persons to represent others); Pilla v\ American Bar Ass'n, 542 
\2d 56 (8th Cir, 1976). Nato is such an entity. 
4ato filed a consent to allow Chief Henry Clayton to represent it, but that is of no moment because 
egulation of practice in the courts is a matter of positive law, serving societal and systemic needs and 
ranscending the stated preference of particular litigants, particularly non-individuals. Chief Henry Clayton 
lay not represent Nato in this appeal; the docketing statement and the portion of the brief filed by him are 
truck. 
'he counseled portion of the brief also claims it was error for the district court to refuse Chief Henry 
Clayton's request to represent Nato, It does so in summary fashion, unburdened by citation of authority or 
ogent argument, but merely adopts by reference the arguments of Chief Henry Clayton. Our reasons for 
sfusing those filings and arguments in this court apply equally to proceedings in the trial court. The district 
jdge was correct in refusing to allow non-lawyers to practice law. 
ye now address the other issues raised by Nato through counsel. In several arguments, Nato objects to the 
lanner and scope of the district court's order dismissing its complaint. It seems to concede a lack of federal 
uestion jurisdiction, but argues that once the district court determined it lacked federal question jurisdiction 
: should not have addressed the other issues: Chief Henry Clayton's representation and Nato's standing to 
ring suit as a Native American Indian tribe. Nato further argues that even if it were proper for the court to 
ddress these issues, the court erred in its determination. 
^e review de novo the district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
hxlinance 59 Ass'n v. United States Dept. of Interior Secretary, 163 F.3d 1150,1152 (10th Cir. 1998). 
lato's complaint asserts the federal district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and 28 U.S.C. § 
331. "[B|oth § 1362 and § 1331 require that the matter in controversy be one arising under the 
institution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Martinez, 519 F.2d 479,480 
10th Cir. 1975).— But the jurisdictional ground is more fertile for recognized Indian tribes because of 
eaty, tribal and other federally derived rights. Accordingly, it was not error for the district court to inquire 
lto Nato's status, and it was correct in determining Nato had no recognized status. The record reveals no 
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qualifying facts as dictated by 28 ILS.C § 1362. That resolved, we now turn to the more general federal 
question issue. 
As best we can determine from the pleadings and briefs, Nato's action is akin to a quiet title action. It 
complains that the state failed to determine or improperly determined the correlative rights of claimants to 
interests derived from a state mineral lease of state resources.—Those allegations do not present a 
controversy arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,1 a and it readily appears that 
allowing an opportunity to amend would have been futile. See Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278,1281-82 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 922 (2001). 
We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal of Nato's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362, its determination that Nato is not an "Indian tribe or band with a governing 
body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior," and its refusal to allow Chief Henry Clayton to 
represent Nato in court proceedings. 
Entered by the Court: 
TERRENCE L. O'BRIEN 
United States Circuit Judge 
FOOTNOTES 
Click footnote number to return to corresponding location in the text. 
^This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; 
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
M3ther than asserting it is fa sovereign indigenous government," Nato provides no indication of its origin or 
legal status. 
^Nato's complaint attempted to include potential claims of the White Mesa Ute Indians and the Skull Valley 
Band of Goshute Indians concerning interests wholly unrelated to Nato's alleged mineral interest. 
^Tenth Circuit Rule 3.4(C) states: "An issue not raised in the docketing statement may be raised in 
appellant's opening brief." Thus, we will address the issues raised in the part of the brief authored by counsel 
for Nato even though they were not contained in the docketing statement filed by counsel. 
—In this motion the State also requests we summarily dispose of the sole issue raised in the docketing 
statement filed by Chief Henry Clayton. In light of our resolution of the issues raised in Nato's brief below, 
this aspect of the motion is denied as moot. 
—28 U.S.C. § 1331 states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." And 28 U.S.C. § 1362 provides: "The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a 
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governing body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in controversy arises 
mder the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States/1 (Emphasis supplied.) 
-Since Nato does not describe its legal status (merely alleging it is "a sovereign indigenous government") it 
s impossible to know whether it has the legal capacity to contract or otherwise hold property. 
LWe also agree with the district court's determination that the purported grievances of the individual tribes 
isted in Nato's complaint were not properly brought by Nato. Further, Nato has failed to raise any argument 
•egarding this issue in its opening brief, and as a consequence, it is waived. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, v. 
\4hoon,3\ F.3d 979,984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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